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NOTES AND COMMENTS
such a manner that evidence of course of dealing between contractual
parties and the usages of their trade is fundamentally necessary to "com-
plete" the agreement and thus fulfill the parties' expectations, the impact
of such extrinsic evidence in interpreting the express terms of the writing,
if not anticipated and dealt with, may prove "unsettling if not disas-
trous." Therefore, businessmen will have to re-examine the standardized
writings upon which they have successfully relied in the past, in light of
the UCC's treatment of course of dealing and usages of trade as tools of
contractual interpretation.
DAVID MARK KELSO
ARSON INVESTIGATIONS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
fourth amendment' protects the individual's right of privacy from arbi-
trary intrusions by the state. The meaning of the word "unreasonable"
in this amendment has been the focal point of a substantial amount of
litigation, and the Supreme Court has played an important role in shap-
ing its definition.2 In regard to searches of the home, recent Supreme
Court decisions have set forth the proposition that all warrantless
searches are unreasonable3 unless they are conducted by consent4 or are
incident to a lawful arrest.5 Evidence gathered from a warrantless search
of the home, not within the purview of the two previously mentioned
exceptions, will be suppressed through the application of the fourth
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
83-84 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
'Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
'Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). In this case the consent exception to
the warrant requirement was recognized, but the facts did not support a finding that consent
had been given. For a case where the exception was recognized, and the facts supported a
showinf of consent, see, e.g., United States v. Malo, 417 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 995 (1970).
'Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925). See also, La Fave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures
Into the "'Quagmire", 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972), for a survey of the various exceptions to
the exclusionary rule.
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amendment exclusionary rule.' However, in two recent cases7 involving
prosecutions for arson, state courts refused to suppress evidence gained
from warrantless searches, neither of which seemed to come within the
scope of the exceptions. This discussion will focus on the two cases in an
effort to ascertain whether their respective approaches can be reconciled
with fourth amendment precedent.
The cases, Bennett v. Commonwealth' and State v. Vader5 are almost
identical from a factual standpoint. 10 In each case there was a fire in the
home of the defendant, and the authorities, immediately suspicious of
arson," arranged an extensive investigation by an expert after each fire
had been extinguished. 12 In neither case was a search warrant obtained,'
3
nor was there a finding that consent had been given to search the prem-
ises. As a result of evidence obtained from these searches, each party was
charged with arson. 4 In Bennett, the defendant was convicted after a
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886). The essence of the exclusionary rule is that evidence obtained by federal
or state officials in violation of the fourth amendment search and seizure provisions is
inadmissible in either state or federal criminal proceedings. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
'Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972); State v. Vader, 114
N.J. Super. 260, 276 A.2d 151 (1971). A third case, State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 139
N.W.2d 406 (1966), might also be included in this discussion because of its factual similarity
to the two cases which will be examined here. However, Rees was a close decision (5-4),
and it was based primarily upon Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which has since
been overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For these reasons there
are serious doubts as to the vitality of Rees as precedent at the present time. Therefore, it
has been omitted from consideration in this article.
1212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972).
'114 N.J. Super. 260, 276 A.2d 151 (1971).
1212 Va. at 864-65, 188 S.E.2d at 216-17; 276 A.2d at 152.
"In Bennett, a police officer sent out to direct traffic at the scene of the fire smelled a
"strong petroleum-like odor," emanating from the fire. Also, this same policeman and a
fellow officer found a plastic picnic jug, containing a petroleum based liquid, in the yard of
the defendant while making a "preliminary investigation" of the fire. 212 Va. at 864, 188
S.E.2d at 216. In Vader, it was stated that the authorities were suspicious of arson, but no
specific reason for this suspicion was given. 276 A.2d at 152.
"In Bennett, the day after the fire was extinguished an investigation was made by a
state deputy fire marshal who was an expert at the investigation of arson. 212 Va. at 865,
188 S.E.2d at 217. In Vader, an expert arson investigator, summoned by the Highland Park
police, performed an investigation four days after the fire was extinguished. 276 A.2d at
152.
'3In Vader, the police had obtained a warrant for a search which they made prior to
the search by the arson expert. This warrant had lapsed, however, by the time the arson
investigator made his search, and it was the evidence from his search that seemed most
critical to the State's case. 276 A.2d at 152.
"In Bennett, it must be noted that objection was made to the admission of other
evidence besides the testimony of the state fire marshal. The other evidence was a jug
containing a petroleum based liquid seized by policemen conducting a "preliminary investi-
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motion to suppress evidence had been denied at the trial level;15 this
conviction was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court." In Vader, a
motion to suppress evidence was granted by the trial court,' 7 but an
intermediate New Jersey appellate court reversed the order and remanded
the case for trial." Even though the two courts faced similar fact situa-
tions in these cases, they employed markedly different approaches in
disposing of the legal problem of suppression of evidence.
Bennett v. Commonwealth: Arson Investigations as Administrative
Searches
In Bennett, the Virginia court was significantly influenced by the fact
that the serach in that case was authorized by the State Corporation
Commission and Fire Hazards Law." This being the case, the court
reasoned that the search in Bennett was administrative in nature and was
also one of the types of warrantless searches permitted by the Supreme
Court decision, Camara v. Municipal Court.2
Camara2 is the controlling decision in the area of administrative
inspections-those inspections which are linked to a regulatory scheme
for the protection of the public health, safety, or morals. In Camara, the
defendant faced prosecution under a city housing code for refusing to
admit a housing inspector charged with enforcement of the city's occu-
pancy laws."2 The defendant had demanded that the officer obtain a
warrant before conducting the search, but the state court ruled that no
gation" at the time of the fire. 212 Va. at 863-64, 188 S.E.2d at 216. The trial court's
admission of this evidence was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court on the basis of the
"plain view" doctrine and the emergency search exception to Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). 212 Va. at 865, 188 S.E.2d at 217. For the purposes of this article,
this ruling is not under challenge. Instead, this article will focus on the admission of the
state fire marshal's testimony, which was the bulwark of the Commonwealth's case.
15212 Va. at 863, 188 S.E.2d at 216.
111d. at 866, 188 S.E.2d at 218.
17276 A.2d at 152.
"Id. at 153. In Vader, the trial court issued an order prior to trial suppressing the
evidence from the arson investigator's search. The State appealed this decision, pursuant
to leave granted. Therefore, since there had been no trial previous to the appellate court's
decision, it is uncertain whether the accused was finally convicted. However, the previously
suppressed evidence seemed most unfavorable to his defense, as it consisted primarily of
testimony by the arson expert and photographs taken by him while conducting his examina-
tion of theaccused's premises. 276 A.2d at 152.
11212 Va. at 865-66, 188 S.E.2d at 217-18, citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-56, -58 (Repl.
Vol. 1969).
2212 Va. at 866, 188 S.E.2d at 218.
21387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The See case was
the companion of Camara, and its effect was to extend fourth amendment protection to
business premises where administrative searches were involved.
2387 U.S. at 525-27.
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warrant was necessary, since inspections of this nature did not come
within the purview of the fourth amendment.? The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that an individual is entitled to fourth amendment protec-
tion where administrative searches are involved." The rule laid down in
Camara requires a search warrant for the execution of administrative
inspections, except in cases of consent5 or emergency."6
The initial question arises as to whether either of the two exceptions
to the Camara rule was available to justify the warrantless search in
Bennett. The Virginia court did not directly confront this problem in its
opinion, but instead rather summarily concluded:
Jessop's [the fire marshal's] daytime entry, without force, under
the authority of the statute was such a permissible inspection as
was contemplated by Camara and does not violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of the defendant?21
A review of the facts in Bennett indicates that neither ground was
available for allowing the circumvention of the warrant requirement.
There was no evidence of a consent search, nor did the Commonwealth
seek to justify the lack of a warrant on this ground." As for the emer-
gency search exception, there was little evidence that the search was
necessary for the protection of the public safety. When the fire marshal
made his search the fire had already been extinguished for several hours,
a situation which suggests that there was little danger to the public safety
at the time of his inspection.2 9 Furthermore, there was no evidence of
explosives or other volatile materials on the premises, a condition which
has justified immediate, warrantless searches in other cases where fires
were involved. 30 Therefore, if the warrantless search in Bennett could not
be brought under either exception, the Camara rule seems to apply fully:
the fire marshal's search should have been accompanied by a warrant.
Since a failure to procure a warrant violated the fourth amendment, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the evidence thereby obtained was
unconstitutional.
In response to this argument, however, the Virginia court stated that
1237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1965).
24387 U.S. at 534, 540.
'Id. at 528-29.
26Id. at 539.
1212 Va. at 866, 188 S.E.2d at 218.
"Brief for Appellee at 3-4, Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215
(1972).
'he fire in Bennett was extinguished during the night of October 27, 1969. The
investigation by the fire marshal in that case was conducted during the daylight hours of
the following day. 212 Va. at 864-65, 188 S.E.2d at 216.
"°Romero v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 714, 72 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1968); cf State v.
Cohn, 347 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1961).
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"Camara did not concern an issue of suppression of evidence, it arose
from a criminal prosecution for refusal of admission to the inspector."',
The court did not elaborate on its reading of Camara any further than
this statement, but the intimation was that it interpreted Camara to hold
only that a homeowner has a right under the fourth amendment to refuse
a warrantless administrative inspection of his premises and an immunity
from prosecution for asserting this right. The Virginia court implied that
the question of suppression of evidence, in regard to constitutionally
forbidden administrative searches, was left open by Camara since the
Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue in that case.3" An
extension of the Bennett court's reading of Camara leads to the following
result: had the inspector in Camara gained entry without consent, cited
the defendant for substantive housing code violations, and then used
evidence from his inspection to support a conviction, the Supreme Court
would not necessarily have applied the exclusionary rule to the fruits of
this warrantless search and thereby have voided the conviction. That
Camara made no explicit rulings on suppression of evidence is true,"
but that it did not implicitly extend the exclusionary rule to evidence
seized from constitutionally forbidden administrative searches is subject
to serious question, 34 especially when that decision is considered with
respect to the entire body of fourth amendment case law.
To better understand the full effect of Camara, it is useful first to
consider that decision from a historical perspective. In extending the
fourth amendment right of privacy to the area of administrative searches,
Camara overruled an earlier Supreme Court decision, Frank v.
Maryland.3" This decision36 had been predicated on a civil-criminal dis-
tinction in regard to searches and seizures. The Court had held that
searches for the evidence of crime posed a threat to the fourth amendment
right of privacy and, therefore, would be subject to a warrant require-
ment, except in certain cases where exigent circumstances were present.38
In contrast, since civil or administrative searches touched only on the
periphery of the right of privacy, no warrants would be required for the
1'212 Va. at 866, 188 S.E.2d at 218.
321d.
"See Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1314, 1332 (1967).
31See cases cited note 42 infra; Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privcay:
Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REV. 1314, 1342-48 (1967).
11387 U.S. at 528.
"Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"Id. at 365-67.
'Id. at 265. In speaking of the fourth amendment protections against official intru-
sions aimed at the gleaning of evidence for a criminal prosecution, the Court noted that
"evidence of criminal action may not, save in very limited and closely confined situations,
be seized without a judicially issued search warrant." Id.
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execution of these searches. 9 Camara abolished this civil-criminal dis-
tinction in ruling that administrative searches
are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment, [and] that such searches when authorized and
conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safe-
guards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual
40
Until Camara, the application of the exclusionary rule had also followed
the civil-criminal distinction.4 Therefore, since Camara marked the de-
mise of the distinction, there is a certain logic implicit in that decision
demanding that the exclusionary rule be extended to the administrative
area, even though the decision itself did not specifically speak to the
point. Furthermore, cases decided subsequently to Camara have recog-
nized that the exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized in a constitu-
tionally forbidden administrative search."
Additionally, it must be noted that the policy considerations which
buttress the exclusionary rule dictate that its scope be extended to include
the area of administrative searches. Essentially, the exclusionary rule
provides the individual with a remedy for fourth amendment violations
by government officials.43 The Court has asserted for a variety of reasons
that the rule is the only practicable remedy. The most universally cited
of these arguments is that the rule serves as a deterrent to unreasonable
searches and seizures on the part of government officials by rendering
evidence obtained from such searches of no value in a criminal prosecu-
91d. at 366-67. In speaking of the fourth amendment's application to civil (administra-
tive) searches, the Court noted:
But giving the fullest scope to this constitutional right to privacy, its
protection cannot be here invoked. The attempted inspection of appel-
lant's home is merely to determine whether conditions exist which the
Baltimore Health Code proscribes. . . . No evidence for criminal prose-
cution is sought to be seized.
Id. at 366.
4387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
4 See Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1314, 1319-23, 1332-36, 1342-48 (1967).
"2United States v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 431 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
878 (1970); United States v. Thriftimart, 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
926 (1970); United States v. J.B. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969), affg
294 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Ark. 1969); United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970); United States v. Kendall Co., 324 F.
Supp. 628 (D. Mass. 1971); Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d
647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); cf People v.
Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (dicta); People v. Laverne,
14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
13Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-57 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-33
(1949).
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tion." Second, the exclusionary rule is necessary for the protection of
judicial integrity by preventing the courts from discrediting themselves
through the use of illegally seized evidence." A third argument points to
the rule's asserted definite constitutional origin, arising out of an interre-
lation between the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures and the fifth amendment's prohibition against self-
incrimination." In recent years this last justification seems to have been
carried beyond its original scope. In Mapp v. Ohio, 7 the Court took the
view that the exclusionary rule had acquired the status of an intrinsinc
constitutional doctrine embodied solely in the fourth amendment, the
fifth amendment no longer being necessary to support its existence. The
Court analyzed the relationship of the two amendments as follows:
The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is com-
plementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in
its sphere of influence-the very least that together they assure in
either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence."
If in fact the exclusionary rule is a constitutional doctrine arising out
of either the fourth amendment alone, or out of the fourth and fifth
amendments taken together, then its extension to administrative searches
would be inevitable. 9 Likewise, the arguments in support of the rule as a
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914). But see Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REv. 665 (1970), where the author claims that there is no empirical evidence to support
the proposition that the exclusionary rule deters unlawful searches and seizures by law
enforcement officers. Id. at 667.
IsMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his famous dissent in Olmstead, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis stated:
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example . . . . If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Id. at 485.
"'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (Black, J., concurring); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 633 (1886). In Boyd, Mr. Justice Bradley stated that he was "unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." 116 U.S. 616,
633.
'7367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Id. at 657.
49The idea that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional doctrine has not received
universal support from the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger has been particularly
critical of this approach and has voiced his sentiments in several dissenting opinions. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,492-93 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part).
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deterrent to unreasonable searches and as a guardian of judicial integrity
seem just as applicable to a constitutionally forbidden administrative
search as they do to a constitutionally forbidden criminal search;" the
need for deterrence and for protection of judicial respect is no greater in
one case than in the other. Moreover, since either type of search by
governmental officials presents the same potential harm to the individ-
ual's right of privacy, a distinction between the two would seem to be
anomalous: the exclusionary rule would apply only to one situation, al-
though constitutional violations would be present in both. Fourth amend-
ment protection, it is submitted, should turn on more consequential mat-
ters than the difference between a state fire investigator and a police-
man. 
5
Bennett v. Commonwealth: The Administrative Search Classification as
a Misnomer
From the foregoing discussion one may conclude that in order for the
Bennett decision to maintain its validity from the standpoint of fourth
amendment search and seizure doctrine, it is necessary to find that the
search in that case was of an administrative nature and that a civil-
criminal distinction still exists in regard to appliation of the exclusionary
rule. On the contrary, if it were found that the search in that case were
one directed primarily toward discovering evidence of crime, the Bennett
approach to the issue of suppression of evidence would be eroded further.
If this were the case, the application of the exclusionary rule could hardly
be avoided, even if a civil-criminal distinction were still recognized in
determining its employment.
An examination of certain sections of the Virginia State Corporation
Commission and Fire Hazards Laws tends to show that the type of
investigation authorized by that statute, and upon which the court in
Bennett relied, is actually an investigation for evidence of crime, rather
than an administrative investigation. The basic provisions of the Vir-
ginia statute authorize the appointment of fire marshals, 3 the investi-
gation of fires,54 and the power on the part of fire marshals to enter
'See People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964);
Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314,
1342-48 (1967).
"1See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. I (1950), where Judge Prettyman commented:
To say a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search
of his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has
no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity.
5 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-56, -58, -59, -67, -70 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
ld. §.§ 27-67, -70. For the text of § 27-70, see note 56 infra.
5"Id. § 27-56, which provides in part:
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burned premises at any time in order to conduct an investigation." In
addition, however, fire marshals are granted the same investigatory pow-
ers as police officers56 and the authority to set into motion criminal
prosecutions whenever their investigations into the origin of fires produce
sufficient evidence of arson. 5 These sections when taken as a whole evince
a rather comprehensive plan for the investigation and prosecution of
arson. In effect, the code seems to grant fire marshals the specific author-
ity to assume what would normally be a function of the police in this
particular area. It would logically follow that fire marshals should be
subject to the same rules of search and seizure, including the exclusionary
rule.
This conclusion was reached by the Indiana Supreme Court in the
case of State v. Buxton,5" where the court did apply the exclusionary rule.
Buxton is almost identical to Bennett from both a factual 9 and statutory
standpoint." In Buxton, during a warrantless search of the defendant's
The Commission shall examine, or cause examination to be made, into
the origin and circumstances of all fires occurring in this State ...
Od. § 27-58, which provides in part:
The Commission, and such person or persons as it may appoint, shall have
authority at all times . . . to enter upon and examine any building or
premises where any fire has occurred ...
"Id. § 27-70, which provides:
The Commission is authorized to appoint deputy State fire marshals, who
shall, in addition to the powers now conferred by law, exercise the same
powers and perform the same duties as city and town fire marshals, as
provided in §§ 27-31 to 27-35, and shall have the same police powers as a
sheriff in the investigation and prosecution of all cases of alleged arson
and of other cases of fires alleged to involve criminality.
In 1972, § 27-70 was amended to the following form:
The Commission is authorized to appoint a chief arson investigator and
assist arson investigators, who shall have the same police powers as a
sheriff in the investigation and prosecution of all offenses involving fires,
fire bombings, bombings, attempts, threats to commit such offense, false
alarms relating to any such offense, possession and manufacture of explo-
sive devices, substances and fire bombs.
Id. (Supp. 1972). The section in its rewritten form clearly discloses the fact that arson
investigations are intended to be searches of a criminal rather than an administrative nature.
511d. § 27-59, which provides in part:
If the Commission shall be of opinion, after investigation as to the cause
or origin of any fire, that there is sufficient evidence to charge any person
with the crime of arson, or with incendiary burning of property, it shall
cause such person to be arrested and charged with such offense, and shall
furnish to the Commonwealth's attorney of the city or county all such
evidence, together with the names of witnesses, and all information ob-
tained by it, including a copy of all pertinent and material testimony taken
by it touching such offense.
-238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547 (1958).
11148 N.E.2d at 548.
9l0IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-802, -805, -808 (Repl. Vol. 1964). The most significant sec-
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fire-wrecked premises by a state fire marshal, a policeman, and an insur-
ance investigator, the policeman discovered a hot plate, a pile of torn
newspapers, and a gunny sack soaked in fuel oil." The seizure of this
evidence led to the defendant's arrest and trial for arson.6 2
When considered in comparison with Bennett, the Buxton case is
instructive for two reasons. First, the Indiana court correctly classified
the fire investigation authorized by statute in that case as a criminal
rather than a civil search. Since no warrant was obtained prior to its
inception, the court found the search to be violative of the state constitu-
tion, and evidence obtained as a result was declared inadmissible.13 Sec-
ondly, the court suggested an approach which may be taken in upholding
the constitutionality of state fire laws which authorize entry into buildings
where fires have occurred but include no warrant provisions. The ap-
proach taken by Buxton was to engraft a warrant requirement upon the
statute," a judicial legislative move that seems mandatory in order that
constitutional conflicts may be avoided. Not to incorporate a warrant
requirement into state fire inspection laws would bring them into conflict
with the basic constitutional mandate that in all but a few exceptional
cases "a neutral and detached magistrate"'" is to make the determination
tion of the three previously mentioned is § 20-808, which sets out in part:
The state fire marshal or his deputies may, in addition to the investigation
made by any of his assistants, at any time investigate as to the origin or
circumstances of any fire occurring in this state.
The state fire marshal or his deputies or any of his assistants may at
all reasonable hours enter any building, property or premises within his
jurisdiction for the purpose of making an inspection or investigation
which, under the provisions of this act or any law which may have been
or may be from time to time enacted requiring the fire marshal to enforce
or carry out, he or they may deem necessary to be made.




5Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948), where the Court remarked:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evi-
dence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to
issue a warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. . . .When the right
of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforce-
ment agent.
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as to whether a search by government officials should be allowed. The
proposition that the authorization of searches is a subject of judicial
inquiry66 is implicit in the American constitutional belief in separation of
powers. Determinations as to the reasonableness of searches and seizures
are not to be left to the legislature or the police. 7
The effect which Bennett will have on future search and seizure cases
in Virginia, particularly in regard to those involving arson, is uncertain."
However, if such a case should ever arise again, perhaps the Virginia
court should look to the reasoning of State v. Buxton for guidance and
abandon the administrative search rationale of Bennett.
State v. Vader: Habitability as the Test for Zones of Privacy
In State v. Vader, the second arson investigation case where a war-
rantless search was allowed, the intermediate New Jersey court did not
discuss a civil-criminal distinction. In that case police were actively in-
volved in the search, and thus the search would have been difficult to
classify as administrative in nature.69 Instead, the court focused upon
whether the defendant's home was entitled to fourth amendment protec-
tion since it had been rendered uninhabitable by fire." In concluding that
it was not entitled to such protection the court reasoned:
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
an individual's privacy and the security of his home. Here, the
premises had been rendered uninhabitable by a fire. All utilities
had been disconnected. No one was occupying the house, the doors
and windows of which were broken. The fire was of suspicious
origin and had resulted in the death of a child. Under these circum-
"8See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471,481-82 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,456 (1948); United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
671d.
"The reason for the uncertainty on this point is that since the events in Bennett
transpired, the General Assembly passed a statute providing for the issuance of search
warrants to fire marshals when entry to burned premises is refused and there is "good cause
or suspicion" of arson. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-32.1 (Supp. 1972). The provisions of this
statute are not mandatory on the fire marshal, however, so there still exists the possibility
that a warrantless search might be made in the future. If this were to occur, Bennett would
serve as controlling precedent, and even though such a search might be violative of state
law, the evidence would not be excluded. Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 735, 121
S.E. 154, 161 (1924). Moreover, the defendant would not be entitled to the statutory
damages remedy for an unlawful search, since this provision has been held to apply only to
searches which are also violative of federal constitutional standards. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-
88 Repl. Vol. 1969), construed in Carter v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 317, 320, 163 S.E.2d
589, 592 (1968).
69276 A.2d at 152.
7Old.
19731
144 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX
stances, the prompt, on-the-scene investigation of the fire by the
authorities did not infringe on defendant's right of privacy or the
security of his home and was not a Fourth Amendment search
requiring a search warrant."
The test which the court employed for determining when an individual is
entitled to fourth amendment protection in regard to searches of the
home is one of "habitability": only when a house is habitable is it entitled
to fourth amendment protection. The current Supreme Court test for
determining protected zones of privacy was formulated in Katz v. United
States72 where the Court focused upon whether or not there had been a
violation of the privacy upon which the defendant "justifiably relied.
'7 3
The Court in Katz, abandoning the trespass doctrine as the test for
determining the scope of fourth amendment protection, adopted a test
more capable of dealing with the multifarious situations arising out of
modern life where privacy is invaded. 74 The Court's test, an attempt to
find a standard which would bear a rational relation to the right sought
to be protected, 7 has been phrased in terms of whether there has been a
violation of "a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion" 76 shown by the defendant.
The question arises whether "habitability" is compatible with the test
for determining protected zones of privacy set out in Katz. It is submitted
that the narrow, categorical nature of the Vader test prevents it from
bearing an altogether rational relation to the right which it seeks to
protect. A finding that premises are uninhabitable is treated as conclusive
on the question of the defendant's expectation of privacy as to those
premises.7 7 The Katz test is more in harmony with the right that is being
protected and thus provides a sounder doctrine.
To illustrate the weaknesses of the Vader test it is helpful to examine
the recent California case, Swan v. Superior Court,7 8 where a form of the
71Id.
72389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71d. at 353.
7'Id. at 352-53. See also Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of
Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. I
(1971).
71389 U.S. at 350-53.
"Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"As examples of unsatisfactory results which would ensue if "habitability" were to
prevail as the test for constitutionally protected zones of privacy, fourth amendment protec-
tion would be unconditionally denied to the individual whose home was under construction
but not yet habitable, or the individual whose home was rendered uninhabitable by disaster.
These results do not seem consistent with the "expectation of privacy" that the individual
may attach to his home.
'18 Cal. App. 3d 392, 87 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970).
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Katz test was applied. This decision is particularly relevant to Vader
because of its factual similarity. In Swann, the defendant's home was
gutted by fire and as a consequence was rendered totally uninhabitable.
7
Several days after the fire, the defendant boarded up the doors and win-
dows in order to keep vandals from removing some personal property
which remained on the premises." Subsequent to these acts, the police
executed a warrantless search of the premises, in which they found evi-
dence of arson, the crime with which the defendant was later charged.,
The California court ruled that the evidence obtained from this search
was inadmissible, having been acquired in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. 2 The court dismissed habitability as a standard for determining an
individual's right to privacy3 and stated that the test was "whether the
person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy, and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable governmental
intrusion." 4 In applying its test to the facts, the court in Swann was of
the opinion that the defendant had disclosed a reasonable expectation of
privacy when he boarded up his premises and this expectation had been
violated by the police search.n From the standpoint of "habitability,"
however, the fact that the premises were boarded up did not make them
any more habitable. Therefore, on the basis of practical application, the
Vader test appears irreconcilable with the prevailing standard for zones
of privacy.
On the other hand, it could be argued that even Swan was overly
rigorous in its emphasis on an affirmative act from the defendant to
demonstrate an expectation of privcay. Where the Katz test is applied to
searches of the home it would seem that no affirmative act would be
necessary on the part of the property owner to manifest such an expecta-
tion of privacy. Instead, there seems to be a sound basis for recognizing
a presumption that the home is of itself included within the protection of
'Id. at 394-96, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
mid.
'11d. at 394-95, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
"id. at 396-97, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83.
1id. at 396, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
'"Id., quoting People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 715, 80 Cal. Rptr.
633, 635 (1969).
lid. at 396, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
mIt seems that the primary defect with "habitability" as a standard for determining
fourth amendment protection where arson investigations are involved is that it should not
be the only factor to receive consideration. Other factors which seem to bear on an expecta-
tion of privacy are: the amount of personal property remaining on the premises, the extent
of destruction caused by the fire, the possibility of danger to the community from the fire,
and affirmative acts on the part of the individual demonstrating the existence, or lack
thereof, of any expectation of privacy. It is suggested that courts consider these other factors
along with "habitability" in determining whether fire-damaged premises are entitled to
fourth amendment protection.
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the fourth amendment. Not only does the very nature of the property
suggest that one may expect privacy there, 7 but the fourth amendment
explicitly states that the people have a right to be secure in their houses
from unreasonable searches and seizures." Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has stated that, except where exigent circumstances exist, all
searches of private property mdst be supported by a warrant. s9 Thus, even
though the accused in Vader performed no affirmative act to demonstrate
an expectation of privacy, his home should nevertheless have been entitled
to fourth amendment protection from a warrantless search. The presump-
tion of fourth amendment protection of the home is so substantial that it
should be overcome only by a showing through some act on the part of
the owner that he no longer has an expectation of privacy.
A Search for Policy Considerations to Justify Warrantless Arson Investi-
gations
In both Bennett and Vader it appears that the courts avoided fourth
amendment precedents and employed rather contrived means to circum-
vent the exclusionary rule. From the approaches taken by the two courts
the inference may be drawn that each opinion was directed toward achiev-
ing the same end, namely, the vindication of warrantless searches in cases
of arson. If this were indeed the objective of the two courts, inquiry must
be made to determine whether or not there are any policy arguments
which justify such an exception to the normal rules of search and seizure
in the investigation of crime.
Recurrent throughout several of the cases examined is the argument
by the state that the requirement of a warrant in arson cases would
greatly frustrate law enforcement efforts in this area." In Bennett, it was
argued that the warrant requirement would be unfeasible in regard to fire
investigations, since a search of the premises would first be necessary in
most cases before any basis for probable cause could be established.9 If
no basis for probable cause were available, then the fire marshal would
be totally foreclosed from making a search. He would not be able to
perform his duties under the statutes, and the legislative scheme would
become a nullity.2 Because of the plausibility of this argument, it be-
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"U.S. CONST. amend. IV, the provisions of which are set out in full in note I supra.
"Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
'0State v. Buxton, 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547, 550-51 (1958); Brief for Appellee at 8-
9, Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972).
"Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215
(1972).
121d. It must be noted that in a great many arson cases law enforcement officers would
not be compelled to resort to the warrant procedure to make a search. Where there is a
burning of the property of another the victim of the fire would most likely consent to a
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comes necessary to ascertain whether arson investigations should be
made one of the general exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement.
Where exceptions are made to the warrant requirement, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the following test must be applied to the type of
search excepted:
[T]he question is not whether the public interest justifies the type
of search in question, but whether the authority to search should
be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search."
In the past exceptions allowed by the Court, there has existed probable
cause to search, but the warrant requirement itself was excused on other
grounds. 4 It appears that to grant a blanket exception to arson investiga-
tions, irrespective of probable cause, would be inconsistent with precedent
and would amount to the undermining of an important fourth amend-
ment principle.
In many arson investigation cases, however, there is often sufficient
evidence to provide a basis for probable cause and the issuance of a search
warrant; the problem is merely one of failure of the inspector to procure
one. Both Vader and Bennett seem to fall into this category. 5 Since the
Supreme Court has created exceptions to the warrant requirement where
probable cause has existed, the question arises as to whether arson investi-
gations conducted without warrants but with the existence of objective
probable cause might also qualify. Where exceptions have been allowed,
the warrant requirement has been excused because the time involved in
obtaining a warrant would frustrate the governmental purpose: evidence
could have been destroyed 6 or removed,97 or an immediate search was
search. Only where a party is suspected of burning his own property would it be likely that
consent would be withheld.
"Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). See also United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27
(1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71 (1966); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
93In Vader, the police had procured a warrant to search on a day previous to the
investigation by the arson expert. This warrant had expired when the latter search was
conducted, but there was no reason to believe that another warrant could not have been
obtained. 276 A.2d at 152. As regards Bennett, see note 11 supra.
"Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (search of area under immediate
control of a party incident to his arrest); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71
(1966) (taking blood sample to determine intoxication immediately after arrest because of
rapid dissipation of alcohol level in blood stream).
"Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (immediate search of car for
contraband goods due to probability that car could be removed from jurisdiction by time a
warrant was obtained).
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necessary for the self-protection of the law enforcement officer involved. 8
No similar exceptional circumstances exist in the case of arson investiga-
tions. Therefore, the consistency of establishing an exception, in spite of
the existence of probable cause in fact, would be questionable.
In many arson cases it must be noted that there will not be evidence
readily available to support a finding of probable cause. However, the
state may perfect its case through various means. Observations by police-
men or firemen9 on the scene of the fire may be one source which will
provide the state with the necessary evidence to make out a showing of
probable cause. Reports by insurance investigators"' also may be of help
to the police, provided there is no collusion, 0' and finally, hearsay evi-
dence may be used to establish probable cause. 02 From the foregoing
discussion, it appears that the problems facing law enforcement officers
in conducting arson investigations in compliance with the fourth amend.-
ment are not as critical as the state may assert.
Conclusions
After examining the problems involved in conducting arson searches
within fourth amendment guidelines, no substantial reason can be found
for granting these inspections a special exemption from the established
rules of search and seizure. Arson investigations are essentially no differ-
ent from any other investigations for crime in that warrantless investiga-
tions in this area pose the same potential threat to the right of privacy.
Neither the Bennett case nor the Vader case, however, gives any recogni-
tion to this important consideration. Instead, the two cases seem to in-
volve contrived formulations for avoiding the exclusionary rule. Perhaps
in their unorthodox approaches to the problem of suppression of evi-
dence, the two cases reveal some underlying dissatisfaction with the exclu-
sionary rule. It is true that the outcome of applying the rule is often overly
lTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968) (search of persons engaged in suspicious
activities and believed to be armed); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (search
of area in which a dangerous suspect is likely to hide while in "hot pursuit" of suspect).
"See Romero v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 714, 72 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1968); State
v. Cohn, 347 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1961); 51 IowA L. REv. 1105, 1109-10 (1966).
'"See Stone v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1010
(1968). Stone was based primarily upon Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), which
held that information obtained as the result of a search by a private individual is not subject
to fourth amendment sanctions on search and seizure. For information on the subject
of how fire insurance companies may avoid payment of policies where the insured is sus-
pected, but not convicted of arson, see Polk, Arson and Related Defenses in Civil Actions
Under Fire Insurance Policies, 1967 INS. L.J. 645.
"'See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960); Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
'"Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 359 (1966).
